Self-configurable cyber-physical intrusion detection for smart homes using reinforcement learning by Heartfield, Ryan et al.
R. HEARTFIELD ET AL. 1
Self-configurable cyber-physical intrusion detection
for smart homes using reinforcement learning
Ryan Heartfield, Member, IEEE, George Loukas, Anatolij Bezemskij, Emmanouil Panaousis, Member, IEEE
Abstract—The modern Internet of Things (IoT)-based smart1
home is a challenging environment to secure: devices change,2
new vulnerabilities are discovered and often remain unpatched,3
and different users interact with their devices differently and4
have different cyber risk attitudes. A security breach’s impact is5
not limited to cyberspace, as it can also affect or be facilitated6
in physical space, for example, via voice. In this environment,7
intrusion detection cannot rely solely on static models that8
remain the same over time and are the same for all users.9
We present MAGPIE, the first smart home intrusion detection10
system that is able to autonomously adjust the decision function11
of its underlying anomaly classification models to a smart home’s12
changing conditions (e.g., new devices, new automation rules and13
user interaction with them). The method achieves this goal by14
applying a novel probabilistic cluster-based reward mechanism15
to non-stationary multi-armed bandit reinforcement learning.16
MAGPIE rewards the sets of hyperparameters of its underlying17
isolation forest unsupervised anomaly classifiers based on the18
cluster silhouette scores of their output.19
Experimental evaluation in a real household shows that MAG-20
PIE exhibits high accuracy because of two further innovations:21
it takes into account both cyber and physical sources of data;22
and it detects human presence to utilise models that exhibit the23
highest accuracy in each case. MAGPIE is available in open-24
source format, together with its evaluation datasets, so it can25
benefit from future advances in unsupervised and reinforcement26
learning and be able to be enriched with further sources of data27
as smart home environments and attacks evolve.28
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection System, Cyber-physical at-29
tacks, Smart Home, Reinforcement Learning.30
I. INTRODUCTION31
The mass adoption of IoT technology in smart homes has32
made them attractive targets to cyber threats, from unlocking33
doors and eavesdropping on occupants through their own cam-34
eras to hijacking voice-controlled personal assistant devices.35
Commercial trends for protecting against such threats revolve36
mainly around preventive measures, such as encryption or two-37
factor authentication, but the assumption that these measures38
are sufficient is not well-grounded [1], as vulnerabilities for39
IoT devices are discovered and exploited routinely despite40
them. In environments involving multiple devices of varying41
levels of trustworthiness and likely inter-dependencies between42
them, such as those found in smart homes, it makes sense to43
try to detect security breaches when they occur.44
Intrusion detection is not new to the IoT [2]. In fact,45
several solutions have been proposed specifically for smart46
city and industrial IoT environments [3, 4]. Smart homes,47
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however, present unique challenges with very specific require- 48
ments that can make generalist approaches unsuitable. They 49
consist of multiple commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices, 50
each often using a different network protocol, sometimes 51
directly connected to the household’s Wi-Fi router, other times 52
connected indirectly through a specialised hub, and usually 53
in an encrypted format. Users tend to develop their own 54
automation rules that virtually link otherwise unconnected 55
devices, including external ones, in unpredictable ways. 56
Furthermore, new vulnerabilities are discovered on a daily 57
basis, and it is unrealistic to expect a smart home intrusion 58
detection system to always be aware of all threats. Addition- 59
ally, cyber-physical attacks (i.e., cybersecurity breaches that 60
have adverse physical impact in the form of unauthorised, 61
delayed, incorrect or altogether prevented actuation, or in the 62
form of physical privacy breaches [5]) can affect domestic life 63
and a person’s behaviour and psychological state in their own 64
home [6]. Different users have different risk attitudes in this 65
context and would wish to configure differently any security 66
measures protecting their smart home. Finally, in most cases, 67
the cost of COTS smart home devices is relatively low, so any 68
added security provision introduced should not itself require 69
expensive equipment to run on. 70
We have addressed the above requirements by designing and 71
implementing MAGPIE (monitoring against cyberphysical 72
threats), an intrusion detection system (IDS) prototype for 73
smart homes subjected to a variety of cyber-physical security 74
threats, both known and (at the time of execution) unknown. 75
For a smart home IDS to be effective against unknown attacks 76
and in changing conditions, it must be able to adapt. We argue 77
that the configuration of an unsupervised classifier can be 78
adapted continuously via reinforcement learning as it provides 79
dynamic capability to continuously adapt an IDS configuration 80
via conceptualisation of “actions” within a detection adap- 81
tation process, guided by learning the relationships between 82
anomalous and normal cyber-physical behaviour in the en- 83
vironment. The challenge here is that an unsupervised IDS 84
system cannot know the groundtruth (i.e., whether there really 85
was an attack or not); thus, reinforcement learning cannot re- 86
ward a classifier’s specific set of hyperparameter values based 87
on the groundtruth. However, in most attacks on a smart home, 88
the less confident a classifier is, the more inaccurate it is in 89
practice. Based on this observation, MAGPIE applies a simple 90
idea for the first time: the reward function of reinforcement 91
learning on an unsupervised classifier’s hyperparameters can 92
be based on the classifier’s own confidence in its output, 93
as expressed through its cluster silhouette scores. We have 94
tested and confirmed the validity of this idea experimentally. 95
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In addition, MAGPIE introduces three more innovations to96
ensure its practicality in a household, including taking into97
account users’ risk tolerance, human presence and cyber-98
physical sources of data. In summary, MAGPIE implements99
the following contributions:100
• Ability to continuously adapt unsupervised smart home101
threat detection to changing conditions. MAGPIE self-102
adapts by applying reinforcement learning on the unsuper-103
vised classifier’s hyperparameters based on a probabilistic104
reward function without an a priori model or knowledge of105
the household configuration.106
• Experimental evaluation with both cyber and physical107
sources of data. From a threat monitoring perspective, the108
physical impact of some security breaches constitutes an109
opportunity because, in conjunction with traditional cyber110
sources of data, it can provide valuable information about111
the system’s security state.112
• Self-configuration based on automated inference of hu-113
man presence. In a smart home, the models of what is114
normal or not depend on human presence. For example,115
a voice-activated action being triggered when a human is116
present carries different significance to one triggered in the117
absence of a human.118
We provide MAGPIE in open-source format for installation119
on a low-cost Linux computer, such as a Raspberry PI*.120
II. RELATED WORK121
Traditionally, the vast majority of IoT security research ap-122
plicable to current smart homes has focused on authentication123
and access control [7, 8, 9]. Lately, there has been a growing124
body of work tackling the challenge of detection, whether125
knowledge-based (utilising signatures of known attacks) or126
behaviour-based (detecting deviation from normal behaviour).127
A. Knowledge-based smart home IDS128
Anthi et al. [10] utilised standard machine learning classi-129
fiers, such as naive Bayes, to categorise IoT activity as normal130
or malicious. The features used were limited to network traffic131
and were similar to those used for non-IoT traffic, including132
timestamp, destination IP, protocol and packet size. In [11],133
the authors specifically classified which types of attacks have134
occurred based on supervised learning. This information can135
be very useful for triggering response mechanisms, but it is136
only applicable for known attacks and requires an extensive137
period of training under attack conditions (two weeks in the138
cited paper), which may be impractical for a household’s smart139
home network.140
Brun et al. [12] focused on detecting attacks on smart home141
IoT gateways. They employed a deep learning-based approach142
using dense random neural networks. However, the attacks143
utilised in the performance evaluation were simple TCP SYN144
denial of service attacks, which were shown to be almost as145
easily detectable by a simple threshold detector. Moustafa et146
al. [13] started with generalist datasets for botnets but enriched147
*The code and datasets used here are provided at https://github.com/isec-
greenwich/magpie
them with simulated IoT sensor data. Their learning approach 148
was based on an Adaboost ensemble of decision trees, naive 149
Bayes and artificial neural networks. However, the approach 150
has not been evaluated with actual smart home devices and 151
does not account for changes in usage patterns over time. 152
Nobakht et al. [14] employed a method based on software- 153
defined networking technology, specifically OpenFlow, for 154
providing modularity in intrusion detection for smart homes. 155
Their experimental evaluation however was on a single light 156
bulb, and the technique itself was based on known signatures 157
of attacks, which limited its wider potential for large smart 158
home setups or previously unseen attacks. 159
Trimananda et al. [20] addressed the specific challenge of 160
information inference attacks in smart homes. Their tool is 161
able to automatically extract packet-level signatures for device 162
events based only on packet lengths and durations to predict 163
which device is activated. Although very useful in anomaly 164
detection, this approach has not yet been employed in this 165
fashion. Additionally, it is naturally limited to attacks related 166
to the unauthorised activation of devices. 167
B. Behaviour-based smart home IDS 168
Wan et al. [21] introduced IoTArgos, which in addition 169
to supervised classification of the data communications of 170
different smart home devices, has a “second stage” of detection 171
using unsupervised learning for unknown attacks. This is a 172
meaningful direction and has been evaluated on a wide range 173
of COTS smart home devices. However, the cost of the two 174
detection stages has not been evaluated, and the method does 175
not take into account the presence of the user or the smart 176
home’s changing conditions. 177
A very interesting idea was developed in EclipseIoT [22], 178
which in addition to authentication and access control, features 179
an early detection provision based on canary files. These are 180
forged files with enticing names (e.g., “SmartLock.py”) placed 181
amongst genuine ones. Modification of a canary file is an 182
indication of unauthorised access. 183
Procopiou et al. [15] proposed a lightweight algorithm based 184
on forecasting and chaos theory to identify flooding and DDoS 185
attacks launched by compromised smart home devices. For 186
every time-series behaviour collected, a forecast is generated, 187
and the error of the forecast against the actual value is 188
assessed by the Lyapunov exponent to determine if an attack 189
has occurred. The evaluation conducted in NS-3 simulation 190
involved low-rate and flooding attacks, but the method has 191
not been extended beyond availability threats. 192
Novak et al. [16] proposed an intrusion detection technique 193
that focuses on identifying unusually short and unusually long 194
activities based on self-organising maps. While the approach 195
of taking into account the length of activities proved to be 196
useful, it is not sufficient by itself and can lead to considerable 197
false positives. 198
Ramapatruni et al. [17] employed a hidden Markov model- 199
based approach that learns what is normal in a smart home. In 200
terms of context, if the user is recognised as being out (based 201
on their mobile device’s Wi-Fi connectivity), then any activity 202
related to doors will result in an abnormal state. A strength of 203
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Table I: Limitations in existing intrusion detection research for IoT and Smart homes Vs. MAGPIE
IDS Cyber sources Physical sources Self-configuration Testbed
[10] IP 7 7 Laboratory
[12] IP 7 7 Laboratory
[13] IP 7 7 UNSW-NB 15, NIMS datasets
[15] IP 7 7 Simulation
[16] ZigBee 7 7 Simulation
[17] IP Sensor readings (HTTP API) 7 Smart home testbed
[18] IP 7 7 Laboratory
[19] IP, WiFi, BLE 7 7 Laboratory
[11] IP 7 7 Smart home testbed
[20] IP 7 7 Smart home testbed
[14] IP 7 7 Smart home testbed
[21] IP 7 7 Smart home testbed
MAGPIE Modular (IP, ZigBee, WiFi tested) Modular (RF, Audio tested) Continuous* Real household
* via RL-based hyperparameter adaptation and Human presence inference
this work is that it can take into account the traffic generated204
by several diverse sensors, but it has been evaluated only in205
simulations in the form of artificial state changes.206
Yamauchi et al. [23] expanded consideration of the user by207
modelling user behaviour as a sequence of events, including208
the operation of IoT devices and other behaviour monitored209
by sensors. Their method learns sequences of events for a210
predefined set of conditions and detects attacks by comparing211
the sequences of events, including the current operation, with212
the learned sequences. This work was extended in [18] and213
compared with a technique based on a hidden Markov model.214
It was tested on four users using smart home devices, but in a215
laboratory setting. Naturally, any legitimate behaviour that had216
not been previously observed would erroneously be flagged as217
anomalous.218
C. Critique of related work219
We observe that there is a wide variety of machine learning220
classifiers utilised in the literature, but there has been no221
emphasis on allowing configuration of intrusion detection222
beyond the design stage or based on the user’s preferences.223
In addition, existing smart home IDSs have largely ignored224
the fact that cyber attacks in smart homes have an observable225
physical impact, which can be useful in detection. Finally, with226
the exception of [23], human presence has not been taken into227
account in smart home IDS research, although normal IoT228
device and network activity differ when the users are at home229
versus when they are not. In Table I, we provide an overview230
of the existing literature on intrusion detection approaches and231
MAGPIE, and in the following sections, we present, in detail,232
how MAGPIE addresses all four limitations.233
III. MAGPIE DESIGN234
Figure 1 summarises the MAGPIE architecture. Its collec-235
tion phase captures and decodes the data coming from cyber236
(computation, communication) or physical feeds (e.g., audio,237
signal strength). It can dynamically activate or deactivate238
interfaces and decode the corresponding raw feeds, such as239
sensor readings or network datagrams.240
Smart homes generate large volumes of usually encrypted241
data [24] that may differ considerably between different envi-242
ronments. In the transcription phase, MAGPIE considers only243
meta-data that are consistent across different smart homes.244
We argue that alternative approaches, such as authenticated245
and encrypted device API queries or passive interception 246
of content with decryption keys, would render the defence 247
mechanism a single point of failure and a target for attack. 248
Moreover, by reading only smart home network communica- 249
tion flow meta-data, MAGPIE is better positioned to preserve 250
privacy. MAGPIE extracts meta-data streams (MDS) based on 251
specific interface datastream parsing logic (e.g., communica- 252
tion/application/sensor protocol) (Figure 2). Rolling window- 253
based parser extraction and buffering allow appropriate per- 254
formance and volume of data samples for processing. After 255
aggregating, statistical information on the extracted meta-data 256
features, such as the mean, standard deviation, min and max 257
of sample frequency, content/message type, size, length, delay 258
and flow direction, is considered. We define the delay meta- 259
data feature as the inter-arrival rate in milliseconds between 260
packets/frames for the same source-destination message type 261
pairs. 262
Table II shows the volume and inter-arrival rate for samples 263
collected in a 5-min window in our smart home testbed during 264
periods of relatively low occupant activity with an aggregate 265
average sample inter-arrival rate of 0.49 s and average sample 266
volume of 3456, with extremes of under 1 ns between input 267
samples in some cases. On the basis of these observations, 268
it is clear that analysis on datastream samples in real time, 269
without windowing and buffering, is impractical on a resource- 270
constrained platform. Moreover, it may prove impractical to 271
offload such volumes of data due to file size, upstream network 272
bandwidth saturation and throttling [25]. 273
Table II: Datastream sample inter-arrival time in seconds with
no smart home occupant present (5-min capture)
Datastream Samples Avg. Min Max Stdev.
IP 569 0.5369 0.00002 4.0338 0.9539
WiFi 3555 0.0892 0.0008 0.2048 0.1023
Sound 12465 0.0240 0.0121 0.0718 0.0146
Zigbee 390 0.7848 0.0002 5.3879 1.3882
RF 300 1 1 1 0
As part of windowing, a synchronised “end of window” 274
datastream buffer is the stage where a parsing instance should 275
initiate feature extraction, interpolation, discretisation and gen- 276
eration of statistical data (Figure 2). The datastream window in 277
the buffer is then forwarded to a parsing logic and interpolation 278
phase, where meta-data extraction and feature interpolation 279
are performed on raw datastreams and are enumerated with 280
protocol mapping identifiers (e.g., addressing, data type). The 281
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Figure 1: The MAGPIE architecture
Figure 2: Parsing datastreams with variable inter-arrival rate
output is the MDS window feed, which is forwarded for282
storage to the MDS datastore to fuse data points across all283
MDS datastreams into an aggregated sample (aMDS). The284
datastore serves as a data historian for anomaly detection285
training (e.g., concept discovery) and captures snapshots of286
MDS data samples used in reinforcement learning-based adap-287
tation (Section III-A). The aMDS fusion extracts common288
statistical features across all MDS feeds, which are later used289
to train a presence inference function within the smart home.290
The aMDS dataset combines common features across MDS291
feeds to generate a single feature-vector sample per window292
t for presence inference (whilst each MDS can have different293
sample rates for t) by omitting source-destination address and294
message type pairs for network data sources and compressing295
some physical MDS input. The average, mode, cumulative sum296
and standard deviation metrics are obtained for each feature297
extracted across each MDS feed.298
The real-time threat monitoring latency is the window299
buffering latency plus the reasoning engine’s prediction la-300
tency. All received MDS feeds are processed, interpolated,301
normalised and scaled in real time during each monitoring302
window interval. This process provides the required feature303
structures for concept discovery training data to learn “normal”304
behaviour and generate an independent anomaly detection305
model for each interface. Note that the complexity of the306
MAGPIE transcription phase is variable based on the cyber307
or physical data source, the sample rate and whether the data308
source is connection-oriented. For example, for network data309
sources (IP, WiFi, ZigBee), the computational complexity of310
the end-to-end parsing logic and interpolation is O(nδ), where311
n is the number of samples (or data set size) per window t 312
and δ represents the computation of distinct source-destination 313
pairs by connection address, port and message type. For 314
physical data sources (RF and Audio), the computational 315
complexity is O(n). For training, the individual linear time 316
complexity for each isolation forest model is O(ζψ logψ) [26]. 317
During real-time detection, the computational complexity of 318
each isolation forest model is O(nζ logψ). From a technical 319
implementation perspective, MAGPIE’s processing efficiency 320
is achieved by running parallel transcription processes for each 321
data source and anomaly model. During the course of testing 322
on a Raspberry Pi3, on average, the transcription phase did 323
not exceed 1 s for each monitoring window t or 2.5 s for 324
the end-to-end processing phases (collection, transcription and 325
reasoning) at peak loads across five data sources. 326
A. Reasoning 327
MAGPIE employs (i) real-time unsupervised anomaly de- 328
tection, (ii) adaptation based on reinforcement learning, and 329
(iii) model selection based on human presence inference. 330
1) Unsupervised anomaly detection: The first building 331
block of MAGPIE’s reasoning is the real-time detection of 332
anomalies on individual interfaces. Here, supervised machine 333
learning techniques are impractical because attack dataset 334
labelling is unlikely to apply across households with different 335
system configurations and different automation rules defined 336
by their users. Let us consider the general case of an MDS 337
feed k ∈ [1,K] monitored during time window t. 338
During that time window, M samples are collected, A 339
of which are classified by an anomaly detection process 340
as abnormal and N of which are classified as normal, for 341
example, based on an isolation forest [26] classifier, one-class 342
support vector machines [27] or support vector data description 343
[28]. We denote by At (resp. Nt) the number of abnormal 344
(resp. normal), according to MAGPIE, samples investigated 345
during time window t. Therefore, regardless of the choice of 346
anomaly classifier used, for each MDS feed k in window t, we 347
denote by Ak,t (resp. Nk,t) the number of anomalous (resp. 348
normal) samples found in feed k during time t. We then define 349
the anomaly ratio pk,t as pk,t = AtAt+Nt . 350
Extending this approach across all feeds, we derive an
aggregate anomaly score at for time window t. We have
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(a) All models pt equal or 1 model
≥0.1 with all others = 0
(b) Variable pt across all models











This transformation is required because different data351
sources can exhibit highly variable behaviour, and a single352
source’s anomaly score is not a reliable means for determining353
an attack state. As described in [29], a simple approach, such354
as a weighted sum, cannot deliver reliable results because in-355
dividual anomaly scores are typically contradictory. Therefore,356
we use the aggregate anomaly score at to address skewness.357
As square roots are commonly used for left skewness while358
cube roots are used for right skewness, the introduction of359
q allows for flexibility in the transformation. In practice, the360
control parameter q configures a higher, lower or balanced361
anomaly score bias across the ensemble. Favouring higher or362
lower scoring bias, however, can have an adverse effect on363
the anomaly score threshold θ defined by the smart home364
occupants for when to report a suspected attack. For exam-365
ple, in Figure 3, we demonstrate how an ensemble of five366
data sources, as in our experiments, can affect the detection367
accuracy if the user has defined a specific θ when q is too368
low or too high. For the top graph in Figure 3, for each369
aggregate score at (where all models are equal to the same370
pt, or one model pt > 0 with all other models pt = 0), we371
show that depending on the user’s defined θ, the value of q372
results in higher false positives or false negatives. For balanced373
accuracy, in this case, q = 3 is an optimal configuration for374
an ensemble of five anomaly models. In the bottom graph in375
Figure 3, we provide three general cases with variable anomaly376
model ratio scores pt. If an occupant defines θ = 0.3 as377
their attack threshold, then q = 2 would result in more false378
positives, while q = 5 would result in more false negatives.379
Thus, a middle-ground q parameter is preferable (again, in this380
example with five models, q = 3). Consequently, q must be381
increased or decreased as the number of data sources changes382
(where a minimum of two data sources, e.g., cyber + physical,383
is assumed and K ≥ 2). In our experiments, we found that a384





, is appropriate and can be385
set automatically.386
As pk,t ∈ [0, 1], this conveniently ensures that at ∈ [0, 1].387
Thus, according to (1), the higher the q ∈ [2, inf] is, the388
more important one abnormal feed is to the overall anomaly389
score. As discussed, we have found experimentally that q = 3390
provides a good balance between ensuring that the overall391
score does not unduly fluctuate between excessively high 392
values caused by small numbers of anomalous MDS feeds 393
(e.g., one cyber and one physical interface) or excessively low 394
values caused by large numbers of normal MDS feeds (e.g., 395
ten cyber/physical interfaces). Thus, for simplicity, equation 396







Finally, the anomaly score is interpreted as an overall 398
monitoring state St for the smart home, abnormal (if at > θ) 399
or normal (if at < θ), based on an anomaly score threshold 400
θ ∈ [0, 1], which is selected by the occupants. 401
In practice, θ is a threshold that represents the risk profile 402
of the household. For example, a very high value, such as 403
θ = 0.9, would mean that the household would not want 404
to be warned unless there are multiple strong indications of 405
anomalies (risk-seeking profile). Intuitively, this is a household 406
that would prefer to minimise false positives at the expense 407
of a greater number of false negatives. In MAGPIE, a global 408
θ threshold represents a single configuration parameter that 409
occupants configure for attack detection. While model-specific 410
θ definitions would increase the flexibility and control for the 411
user, it would also increase the configuration complexity. First, 412
users would require technical expertise to determine which 413
θ to use for each data source, as it is unrealistic to assume 414
a priori knowledge on the mapping between which θ values 415
would bias one source over another. Furthermore, considering 416
a preference for cyber or physical attack detection in cyber- 417
physical IDS, it may be ineffective to define specific θ values 418
that bias one cyber or physical source over another, specifically 419
because attacks against either may be initiated via cyber 420
or physical space [5]. By comparison, a global θ definition 421
specifies a required threshold for an aggregate anomaly alert 422
to be considered significant enough to be a substantive attack, 423
regardless of whether the attack source is cyber or physical. 424
Further, to improve the processing of MDS samples as 425
timeseries data, a sliding window of MDS samples is defined 426
per MDS feed. The sliding window enables the anomaly score 427
ratio calculation to take into account a previous window (or 428
windows) of MDS activity. 429
2) Adaptation based on reinforcement learning: A newly 430
installed smart home’s dataset is typically free from con- 431
tamination. After some time, however, the MDS datastore 432
is likely to contain adversarial data samples from historic 433
attacks or compromised devices. Therefore, it is important to 434
adapt the learning process to cope with adversarial datapoints. 435
This requirement is addressed naturally in certain unsupervised 436
learning approaches through the application of contamination 437
hyperparameters that adjust the decision threshold used for 438
anomaly detection. Furthermore, what is considered normal in 439
a household can change continuously as devices are added, 440
removed or updated and as people add or remove automation 441
rules or simply change how they use the devices. Therefore, 442
changes in the datastream distribution require continuous adap- 443
tation of the anomaly detection threshold. Concept discovery 444
is unique for each smart home, even for households with 445
identical smart home configurations, because the network, 446
sensor and actuation activity depends on the human factor 447
[30]. Therefore, an unsupervised anomaly detection model 448
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Figure 4: MAGPIE’s reinforcement learning for threat detection re-configuration
Figure 5: MAGPIE Reasoning Engine overview
developed for one smart home is not portable to another.449
As it is generally infeasible to obtain a priori knowledge450
of the correct contamination level, we propose the use of451
reinforcement learning to continuously update the anomaly452
classifier’s hyperparameters.453
The reinforcement learning mechanism in MAGPIE re-454
cursively explores and exploits detection reward feedback455
across different anomaly classifier configurations, where a456
single action-state (i.e., the anomaly classifier hyperparameter457
configuration) is selected during each step. The process treats458
the continuous capture and analysis of each MDS snapshot459
as an adversarial multi-armed bandit (MAB) environment460
[31, 32] because the composition of an individual dataset461
snapshot collected and analysed by MAGPIE (e.g., in terms of462
volume and data points) is continuously changing during real-463
time operation. This approach enables the anomaly detection464
to adapt to previously unseen data and to identify legitimate 465
changes that occur in the environment that are expected to 466
stabilise over time, whereas attack anomalies remain distinct 467
because of their sparse occurrences. 468
For each MAB iteration, we define a probabilistic reward 469
feedback based on the cluster silhouette scores of the anomaly 470
detection results generated for each analysed dataset snapshot. 471
In practice, the reinforcement learning process rewards the 472
action-states (e.g., bandit arms) that reduce uncertainty in its 473
own decision. Below, we describe the bandit environment, 474
action-state parameters and reward generation algorithm: 475
[Bandit environment]: Defined as an adversarial bandit 476
[33], where for each MAB action-state parameter iteration 1 477
to N (where N is the step horizon for a bandit episode), MDS 478
data snapshot i ∈ [J ] is selected at random, and [J ] is the set 479
containing all current MDS feed datastore snapshots. 480
[Action-state parameter]: The bandit arms are defined by 481
the anomaly model contamination hyperparameter χ, which 482
corresponds to the proportion of outliers in snapshot i used 483
for anomaly modelling. The χ hyperparameter controls the 484
anomaly detection decision threshold based on the anomaly 485
detection classifier. For example, for our MAGPIE implemen- 486
tation, χ controls the decision threshold of an isolation forest 487
classifier based on the decision function described in [26]. 488
[MAB reward generation algorithm 1)]: The reward logic 489
is as follows: for a given window t ∈ [1, T ], each MAB iter- 490
ation corresponds to a given action-state (i.e., contamination 491
hyperparameter) χ. We define at,χ as the anomaly score value 492
of time window t for a contamination hyperparameter χ, and 493
we denote ~aχ as the vector of all anomaly scores for χ for all 494
the different time windows t. 495
Next, using K-means clustering with the Euclidean dis- 496
tance, we generate two clusters that contain higher and lower 497
anomaly scores. We define the reward value Rχ,i for snapshot i 498
as the silhouette score from the dataset clusters that represents 499
a measure of cluster similarity. 500
Figure 4 shows a high-level illustration of the reinforce- 501
ment learning role. During real-time operation, 1) the cur- 502
rent anomaly model’s configured detection threshold classifies 503
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ALGORITHM 1: Algorithm for IDS RL Reward
Input : Anomaly scores produced by χ for each
window in dataset i (at,χ)
Output: MAB reward value Rχ,i
1 Function MABReward:
2 for t ∈ [1, T ] do
3 ~Aχ ← at,χ ;
4 end
5 k = 2 ;
6 ~Cχ = KMeans( ~Aχ, k) ;
7 Rχ,i = Silhouette(~Cχ) ;
8 return Rχ,i ;
9 End Function
MDS samples during each monitoring window t. Depending504
on either the number of samples collected or the time delta505
between collection periods, 2) MDS sample snapshots (e.g.,506
M samples across K feeds) are sent to a “MAB RL” function507
to determine anomaly model hyperparameter χ based on508
the newly updated data sample of recent and historic MDS509
samples. Once the updated MDS samples are processed by the510
“MAB RL” function, 3) the model configuration computed by511
the RL process is issued as an updated model configuration512
(χ) for real-time anomaly detection. This process enables the513
anomaly model configuration to adapt its detection threshold514
via the RL process to respond to changes in the MDS data515
sample distribution and to discover previously unidentified516
threats.517
Figure 5 shows the reinforcement learning process.518
• Real-time detection. During each detection window t,519
following collection and transcription processing (1.1), the520
presence inference layer classifies the aMDS sample to521
determine the presence inference state (1.2) and then selects522
the most appropriate anomaly detection model to use for523
each subsequent MDS sample forwarded in the window524
(1.3). The user’s risk threshold θ is used to compute the525
window’s aggregated anomaly score by means of formula526
(1).527
• Continuous RL adaptation. Once the sample input thresh-528
old (which is defined by the sample data size or time delta)529
is met, the received MDS samples are stored as a snapshot530
consisting of n windows in the MDS datastore set [J ] (2.1).531
MDS samples are selected at random during each MAB532
arm iteration. During each trial (2.2), each MDS model is533
trained with contamination hyperparameter χ (i.e., the MAB534
action-state parameter), with the MDS dataset excluding the535
randomly selected MDS snapshot i (i.e., the non-stationary536
bandit environment). Snapshot i is then used as test data for537
the trained anomaly model, producing an array of anomaly538
scores for each window in the snapshot, where the reward539
Rχ,i is computed by the reward Algorithm 1. Once the540
number of predefined RL trials has been reached, the χ541
hyperparameter “tuned” model is selected for use in the542
real-time anomaly detection process. The RL process is re-543
initiated once a new snapshot is stored. 544
To estimate the reliability of MAGPIE’s reward mechanism, 545
in section V, we experimentally evaluate two popular MAB 546
algorithms that are commonly applied in non-stationary and 547
adversarial bandit problems against a random selection method 548
and compare their the cumulative average regret, cumulative 549
average reward and average regret. We then proceed to estab- 550
lish the quality of the arm (χ) selection for the optimal bandit 551
method using a fixed step horizon and evaluate the selection by 552
generating an AUC-ROC model score for the corresponding 553
isolation forest anomaly classifier configurations. 554
Monitor state and source detection - The state and source 555
variables are intended to inform the household of whether the 556
smart home is subject to anomalous behaviour after computing 557
the detection score (e.g., under attack), as well as the MDS 558
feeds with the highest anomaly score, which is indicative of 559
the utilised attack vector (e.g., IP network, Zigbee network). 560
3) Human presence inference: Certain smart home system 561
activity is observed irrespective of occupant presence. For 562
example, a voice-controlled home assistant sends a continuous 563
keep alive IP packet to the cloud regardless of whether 564
occupants are using it. Other cases of system activity would be 565
unusual if no human is present. For example, consider the case 566
where network traffic from a ZigBee motion sensor increases 567
dramatically or a voice command is activated even though no 568
one is home. Therefore, it may make sense to train different 569
machine learning models for the two cases of presence and no 570
presence. Human presence inference can be based on a simple 571
manual process, where occupants set it manually when they go 572
to sleep or leave home, or it can be performed automatically 573
before anomaly detection to select the machine learning model 574
that corresponds to the presence state identified. 575
IV. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION AND SETUP 576
We have evaluated our prototype implementation by inte- 577
grating it within the smart home of a real household with 578
three members. Figure 6 shows the layout of the devices, 579
which are described in Table IV, referenced by number ID 580
in Figure 6, and accompanied by the smart home automation 581
rules specified by the household, which are summarised in 582
Table V. The setup includes a common home Internet router 583
(2) with a WiFi LAN for WiFi-enabled devices (3-7, 13) and 584
a ZigBee gateway (8) for Zigbee devices (9-12) connected to 585
the home router via Ethernet. Remote connectivity to WiFi and 586
ZigBee devices is facilitated by respective cloud services via 587
the Internet. MAGPIE (1) collects all local and Internet traffic 588
traversing the home router via an Ethernet SPAN port. Its WiFi 589
and ZigBee interfaces passively monitor WiFi and Zigbee 590
network frames on their configured RF channels. The software 591
defined radio (SDR) interface captures spectrum readings in 592
the respective WiFi and ZigBee 2.4 GHz ranges. MAGPIE’s 593
microphone is directly connected via USB. An adversary 594
within wireless range of the smart home can execute ZigBee 595
and WiFi attacks using an attack laptop, SDR peripherals and 596
ZigBee antennas with customised firmware. The adversary can 597
also target the smart home remotely via compromised cloud 598
services or via command and control of compromised devices. 599
See Table IX for a list and descriptions of the attacks. 600
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Figure 6: Smart home testbed for MAGPIE prototype experiments
Table III: Live capture sample dataset statistics
Dataset Mean length Attack States* Stdev
45 x Normal 713.7 s N/A N/A
10 x A1 36.4 s .524 0.007
10 x A2 39 s .542 0.051
10 x A3 25.2 s .527 0.038
10 x A4 37.8 s .526 0.018
10 x A5 27.6 s .572 0.033
10 x A6 25.6 s .551 0.054
10 x A7 29.2 s .615 0.283
* Average ratio of attack to normal states during attacks
Figure 7 presents the MAGPIE prototype’s technical601
schematic. Each MAGPIE interface (1: Ethernet, 2: ZigBee602
antenna, 3: WiFi antenna, 4. Microphone, 5: SDR RF scanner)603
has individual data collection and parser processes managed604
by a window synchronisation daemon to forward all MDS605
datastreams to a message queue (ZMQ publisher) based on a606
defined time window. The ZMQ message queue forwards each607
MDS datastream to a datastore. Then, MDS pre-processing608
subscribers pull each MDS datastream from the ZMQ message609
queue, preprocess and forward the prepared MDS feature610
vectors to each respective MDS Isolation Forest model for611
anomaly detection and aggregated threat detection output. In612
parallel, the aMDS feed is forwarded to the random forest613
presence classifier for presence model selection. MAB RL614
adapted isolation forest models are trained, stored in the615
datastore and then loaded into the anomaly model selection616
and detection process after every MAB RL iteration.617
The behaviour of occupants in the testbed and their inter-618
actions with the smart home devices and automation rules619
was allowed to occur naturally, with the addition of some620
requested actions to ensure that all automation rules or devices621
were activated during data collection. Training data collection622
was conducted intermittently during a 1-month period. The623
locations of the MAGPIE prototype and IoT devices remained624
static, with the exception of the mobile and tablet devices,625
which moved with the occupants using them. In total, there626
were 45 normal data collection runs with an average length of627
713.7 s each and 70 attack data collection runs with an average628
length of 31.5 s each. In Table III, we provide summary629
statistics related to the datasets collected during the 1-month630
experiment.631
A. Cyber-physical meta-data features in the smart home 632
In Table VI, we present each of the cyber-physical MDS 633
feeds and the corresponding features collected. Further sta- 634
tistical flow information, such as sample frequency, average 635
and standard deviation metrics, are added during parsing. We 636
utilise tshark’s display filter at run-time for standard input into 637
the MDS parser, applying only regex operations to input data. 638
Note that for physical data sources such as audio and radio 639
frequency spectrum, we utilise custom (a python application) 640
and open-source libraries (rx power from rx tools [34]) for 641
feature collection. On the testbed, we apply the following 642
constraints based on observation: 643
• WiFi data frames are redundant and ignored as they pro- 644
vide the network footprint, which is already monitored 645
in encapsulated IP packets. WiFi “Request/Clear to Send” 646
control frames are ignored as these are mainly used to avoid 647
hidden-node collisions. Therefore, only WiFi management 648
frames, which can be exploited to disrupt or infiltrate a WiFi 649
network, are monitored. 650
• ZigBee sensors and actuators, with the exception of coor- 651
dinator nodes (e.g., gateways), use dynamic network ad- 652
dressing. Therefore, all non-coordinator nodes are addressed 653
using the same numerical value. This does not impact the 654
ability to model anomalous ZigBee patterns as sensor and 655
actuators generate a fairly predictable network footprint. 656
• Radio frequency spectrum analysis covers the 2.4 GHz 657
frequency band for 802.11G and ZigBee, which can also 658
include Bluetooth and other 802.15.4 wireless protocols. 659
1) Risk-based unsupervised threat monitoring with rein- 660
forcement learning adaptation: 661
• Isolation forest anomaly detection. We have opted to im- 662
plement unsupervised anomaly detection using the isolation 663
forest algorithm in Python with the Scikit Learn library 664
[35]. It performs anomaly detection by isolating sample 665
data points through random feature selection and value 666
splitting, selecting a random value between the maximum 667
and minimum bounds of a data sample feature. No prior 668
assumptions are made regarding the distribution of feature 669
values. Therefore, randomised feature splitting is effective 670
for hybrid feature-sets of both continuous and categorical 671
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Table IV: Smart home testbed devices and network connectivity
ID Device Type Interface Description
1 MAGPIE prototype ZigBee, WiFi, RF, Audio, Ethernet (IP) Raspberry PI 3 “MAGPIE-enabled” prototype
2 WiFi router WiFi 802.11G, Ethernet (IP) Vodafone Broadband home router
3 Home assistant WiFi (IP) Amazon Echo voice-controlled home assistant connected to WiFi router
4, 5 Smart lightbulb WiFi LIFX smart light bulb connected to WiFi router & Amazon Echo via Cloud
6 Smart camera WiFi (IP) Somfy Protect smart camera connected to WiFi router & IFTTT via Cloud
7 Tablet WiFi Samsung S2 tablet connected to WiFi router
8 Smart hub Ethernet (IP), ZigBee, Zwave SmartThings hub connected nodes via ZigBee & WiFi router via Ethernet (IP)
9 Motion sensor ZigBee SmartThings motion sensor connected to smart hub via ZigBee
10 Smart outlet ZigBee SmartThings power outlet connected to smart hub via ZigBee & Amazon Echo via Cloud
11 Presence ZigBee SmartThings presence sensor key chain dongle connected to smart hub via ZigBee
12 Multi-purpose sensor ZigBee SmartThings multi-purpose sensor connected to smart hub via ZigBee
13 Smart phone WiFi, Cellular (3/4G) Connected to WiFi router (external connectivity to smart home control software via 3/4G)
Figure 7: MAGPIE prototype technical schematic
Table V: Smart Home testbed automation integration and rules
Trigger Platform Action WAS Antecedent
Amazon Echo Voice trigger command IFTTT Somfy Protect actuation
Amazon Echo Voice trigger command Alexa Skills LIFX bulb actuation
Amazon Echo Voice trigger command Alexa Skills Outlet actuation
SmartThings Mobile app “On” button SmartThings Outlet actuation
SmartThings Door-open detection SmartThings SmartThings Multi-sensor
Amazon Echo Motion sensor detection IFTTT Somfy Protect Arm/Disarm
LIFX Mobile app “Bulb” button LIFX LIFX bulb actuation
WAS: Workflow Automation Service
Table VI: MAGPIE prototype data feeds and meta-data stream
(MDS) features
Data feed Input Base Features
IPv4 (TCP/IP) pkts C src*, dest*, port, pkt type, pkt sz, ttl*, pkt delay, flow dir*.
WiFi 802.11 frames C+P src*, dest*, port, frame type, frame sz, rssi, frame delay
ZigBee (802.15.4) pkts C src*, dest*, pkt type, pkt sz, pkt delay
Microphone audio P rms frequency threshold, rms
RF (2.4GHz) Spectrum P † dB power level (per frequency bin)
C = Cyber, P = Physical, *aMDS: not used, † aMDS: Avg/Stdev of all bins
data, as is the case with MDS feeds. The recursive feature672
partitioning represents a tree structure, whereby the number673
of times a feature is split to isolate a sample follows a674
traditional tree path length from the root to a terminating675
node. The average tree path length represents the decision676
function used to classify observations as normal or anoma-677
lous [26]. For each MDS feed generated, an independent678
feed-specific isolation forest model is created. Together, the679
forests form an ensemble of models used to produce an 680
aggregate anomaly score during each monitoring window. 681
• Adversarial multi-armed bandit reinforcement learning. 682
MAGPIE models threat detection adaptation in a smart 683
home as an adversarial bandit environment based on the 684
premise that what is normal behaviour (e.g., devices, net- 685
work traffic, user interaction) may frequently change in 686
a smart home. Therefore, MAGPIE trains its RL-based 687
anomaly classifiers on a continuously changing series of 688
collected dataset snapshots. At each time step, for each 689
arm pull (i.e., isolation forest χ hyperparameter selection), 690
the smart home bandit chooses at random a dataset to test. 691
Therefore, on the basis of algorithm 1, the distribution of 692
reward Rχ,i for each action state arm is drawn from an 693
i.i.d. distribution based on randomly selected MDS dataset 694
snapshots. In this case, as each arm’s reward distribution 695
changes at random in the adversarial bandit environment, 696
the EXP3 (exponential-weight algorithm for exploration and 697
exploitation [33, 36]) algorithm is a natural and suitable 698
choice to establish the optimal χ configuration for the 699
isolation forest. For comparison against EXP3, we also 700
select a non-stationary sliding-window based UCB (upper- 701
confidence bound) algorithm [37], where the reward policy 702
is weighted according to a constant step size used to update 703
the reward estimate (we defined a step size of 0.1, which 704
moves the agents estimate 10% closer to the most recent 705
observed reward). UCB is a popular choice for traditional 706
stationary MAB reinforcement learning problems, achieving 707
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MAB Algorithm Parameters
EXP3 γ = 0.1, arms* = 10, iters.†=6000
Non-stationary UCB1 exploration (C) = 2, λ = 0.1, arms* = 10, iters.†=6000
*hyperparameter configurations, † action-step horizon
Table VII: EXP3 and non-stationary UCB1 MAB parameters
Table VIII: MAGPIE prototype Reasoning Engine model
configuration parameters
Anomaly detection (Unsupervised learning) configuration
Algorithm Isolation Forest
Trees (ζ) 200 (per MDS model)
Sub-sampling (ψ) 250 (per MDS model)
Bootstrap Sampling without replacement
Max Features All features (randomly selected per split)
Contamination (χ) Bins = 0.001, 0.002, 0.005, 0.01, 0.2, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7
θ 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
Presence inference (Supervised learning)
Algorithm Random Forest
Trees (ζ) 100
Sub-sampling (ψ) 250 (per MDS model)
Max Depth 15
Bootstrap Sampling without replacement
Max Features Auto (max features=
√
features)
θ 0.3, 0.5, 0.7
Detection adaptation (Reinforcement learning) configuration
Algorithm EXP3 (γ=0.1, 6000 step-horizon)
Reward metric As per section III-A
Presence 1 (Activity), 0 (No activity)
MAB Arms 10 - (Contamination χ Bins)
logarithmic regret for the number of actions/arm pulls (in708
this case, χ parameters) selected over time [38], where709
regret refers to the expected decrease in reward gained710
during execution of the learning algorithm instead of acting711
optimally [39]. In other words, the regret is the difference712
between the reward of a given policy (i.e., the learning713
algorithm) and that of the optimal static policy in hindsight.714
In this case, to adjust to stochastic, non-stationary bandit715
behaviour, a discounting factor (λ) based on a step-size716
sliding window is applied to a UCB1 policy reward estimate.717
The EXP3 and non-stationary UCB1 implementations were718
adapted from the bandit algorithms developed in [40] and719
[41], respectively. In Table VII, we summarise the config-720
uration parameters for the EXP3 and non-stationary UCB1721
algorithms.722
2) Human presence inference: In our implementation, the723
presence of people is detected with a supervised random forest724
(RF) classifier using ground-truth labels defined by the user,725
as RF is commonly used for lightweight machine learning in726
the IoT [42]. Other lightweight supervised machine learning727
classifiers are similarly useful. Labelling of aMDS data sam-728
ples (user presence (1)/no user presence (0)) is pre-configured729
for the initial training of the prototype during the start-up730
learning phase. Subsequent training requires users to actively731
inform MAGPIE of the time periods in which they are actively732
present in the household (unsupervised presence inference is733
outside the scope of the prototype development). We define a734
simplified household environment for presence inference based735
on whether occupants are actively or passively interacting with736
the smart home network. By observing the behaviour of a sub-737
sample of collected aMDS data points (Figure 8), we see a 738
distinguishable impact of presence and no presence for most 739
datastreams. However, aside from other physical sources, basic 740
sound measurements as a feature may be problematic in the 741
face of an audio injection attack. We evaluate this impact 742
on automated presence inference in section V-A, where we 743
also assess overall detection results, showing that presence 744
inference helps increase accuracy. 745
B. Smart home cyber-physical attack vectors 746
We have subjected our testbed to attacks targeting WiFi, 747
ZigBee and voice-enabled home assistant communication tech- 748
nologies, as well as corresponding smart home device control 749
software and third-party apps, all of which are commonly 750
deployed within today’s smart home environments. WiFi is 751
currently the primary connectivity medium in most smart 752
homes, not only for device-to-device communication but also 753
as a network gateway to the cloud services on which most 754
smart home devices rely. ZigBee is a low-powered wireless 755
medium that provides energy-efficient connectivity for low- 756
resource devices that connect to more capable control gate- 757
ways (e.g., ZigBee hub with Ethernet or WiFi backhaul). How- 758
ever, it has limited bandwidth for data communication (250 759
kbit/s per channel in the 2.4 GHz band used in the testbed). 760
Security-wise, the speaker-microphone pair of a voice-enabled 761
home assistant is typically an unmonitored communication 762
link, which has been shown to be vulnerable to exploitation 763
[44]. Smart home devices such as security cameras offer 764
physical monitoring protection of the household; however, 765
recent high-profile compromises of these types of systems have 766
demonstrated how their exploitation can lead to significant 767
breaches of the physical privacy of occupants and, in some 768
cases, impact their emotional well-being [6]. 769
In Table IX, we describe the attack vectors and their cyber- 770
physical impact based on [5]. All attacks were executed in both 771
the presence and no presence conditions. Note that localised 772
attack vectors (namely, WiFi deauth (A1), Evil twin (A2), 773
ZigBee jamming (A3) and Node amplification (A4)) could also 774
be launched remotely if a target device were compromised 775
through third-party apps, cloud-based control software, or 776
compromised software and hardware supply chains [6]. For 777
example, both home assistants and smart lightbulbs provide 778
the ability to host their own WiFi access point, whilst ZigBee 779
devices are capable of reconfiguring themselves as ZigBee 780
network coordinators. 781
C. Experimental scenario, settings and parameters 782
Our experimental process consisted of three phases. Phase 783
1 was related to (i) live sample data collection of smart home 784
behaviour (in terms of the data sources monitored) when not 785
under attack and (ii) execution of each attack vector. This 786
phase comprised two different types of experiments: one where 787
users were present during data collection and another where 788
no users were present in the household. Phase 2 was related to 789
the adaptation of the offline reinforcement learning anomaly 790
detection. Phase 3 was related to live monitoring of attack 791
detection using the RL-optimised MAGPIE configuration. 792
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Figure 8: Aggregated MDS (aMDS) behaviour during “No presence” (orange dashed line) and “Presence” (blue line) states.
Table IX: Experiment attack vectors with cyber-physical impact classification [6] in the smart home
Attack* Layer C* P* Description
(A1) WiFi
deauth




Data Link C, I, A PA, IA Evil twin (ET) spoofs WiFi network disrupting WiFi-connected devices; entices connection to attacker-controlled access
point. Results in prevented actuation through WiFi beacon frame interference and incorrect actuation for ET-connected
devices under the control of the attacker. Executed using the aircrack-ng suite.
(A3) ZigBee
jamming
Physical A PA ZigBee communication is jammed on current radio frequency. Results in prevented or delayed actuation. Executed




Network I, A DA Targets a vulnerability in Samsung SmartThings smart outlet, which acts as a router/relay in the ZigBee PAN. An
unsolicited ZigBee data request sent to the SmartThings outlet returns four encrypted data packets in response. Replay
of a doctored PCAP containing a large volume of data requests triggers exponential traffic amplification against the
outlet. The resulting volume of data packets returned quickly overwhelms the SmartThings network bandwidth resulting
in prevented or delayed actuation. Executed using the RZRAVEN USB Stick with KillerBee suite https://github.com/






I UA Compromised smart device (Samsung Tablet) with its on speaker-microphone pair injects malicious commands into the
Amazon Echo home assistant, eliciting unauthorised actuation. The commands continuously arm or disarm the smart
camera and turn on or off any household lights. A second-order impact is the DoS of smart home systems that may
also be used to detect physical intrusion. A remote command and control channel directs the execution of the audio
injection. Executed using Stringify API as the command and control channel to a custom Android app that plays and




Application C UA, BP Compromised smart home security camera user credentials (e.g., phishing/insecure network) used to create a remote
connection to the camera video feed (breaching physical privacy). Executed using the user credentials to obtain an




Application C UA, BP Compromised smart home IFTTT user credentials (e.g., phishing or insecure network). Issues actuation commands
via occupant workflow automation rules (“Arm/Disarm camera”, “Turn on light bulb”, etc.), disrupting smart home
devices via unauthorised actuation. Smart outlet, camera and bulbs are continuously issued actuation commands at
high frequency; light bulb set to “flicker”, which could lead to medical impact in the form of seizures for occupants
with photosensitive epilepsy or to electrical damage caused by surges in voltage.
*See attack cyber-physical impact graphs: https://github.com/isec-greenwich/magpie
C* (Cyber impact)- C: Confidentiality, I: Integrity, A: Availability
P* (Physical impact)- PA: Prevented Actuation, IA: Incorrect Actuation, UA: Unauthorised Actuation, DA: Delayed Actuation
BP:Breach of physical privacy
Table III provides statistics about the live capture sample793
dataset for normal and attack execution experiments. Some794
attack vectors (WiFi de-authentication and ZigBee jamming)795
were observed to have a persistent effect on specific device796
behaviour, such as total connectivity loss to the WiFi network797
or disconnection of ZigBee nodes from the PAN, even after798
the attack had stopped. To ensure that persistent symptoms of799
one experiment did not interfere with another, after each attack800
execution, we reconnected affected devices and nodes to their801
respective networks and tested the automation rules to ensure802
that the smart home had returned to a known good state. For803
phase 1, each attack vector was executed independently so804
that normal and attack data samples were equally distributed805
with respect to the amount of time the smart home was 806
monitored by MAGPIE under normal conditions and during 807
attack execution. This process ensured that the captured dataset 808
had a balanced set of normal and attack samples for testing. 809
All live sample collection experiments were conducted on the 810
training data for phase 2 reinforcement learning adaptation of 811
the MAPGIE’s anomaly models, whereas phase 3 consisted of 812
executing live attack vectors against the MAGPIE prototype in 813
a real-time monitoring state with the optimised anomaly model 814
configuration. During the experiment, the users interacted with 815
the smart home according to their normal routine. This activity 816
generated a dataset that represented natural smart home user 817
behaviour. Table X shows the different types of interactions 818
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Table X: Summary of occupant device and network interaction
in the smart home testbed
Device / Platform Action Activity description
SmartThings Multi-Sensor P, T, S Opening/closing door & status check on app
SmartThings Motion-Sensor P, T, S Moving in range of motion sensor & status check on app
Smart Outlet P, T, S Turning on/off via button & app & status check on app
Amazon Echo (via Voice) P Asking questions, playing music, triggering LifX, Somfy
Amazon Echo (via app) P, T, S Playing music, Amazon Echo activity & changing Alexa skills
Somfy Protect P, T, S Reviewing camera feed, triggering security mode via Somfy app
LifX lightbulbs P, T, S Triggering LifX bulbs via the LifX mobile app
*P=Physical, T=Tablet, S=Smart phone
performed by the users.819
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS820
The MAGPIE prototype’s performance is evaluated in terms821
of the i) attack detection accuracy with reinforcement learning822
χ adaptation Vs. random χ configuration, and the effect on823
performance with and without cyber-physical sources of data;824
ii) accurate detection of presence in the smart home and its825
effect on threat detection performance for dynamic anomaly826
model selection; iii) attack detection latency, which refers to827
the time delay before the prototype system correctly identify828
an attack, taking into account correct interface source detec-829
tion; and iv) end-to-end monitoring latency, which measures830
the processing delay for each of the MAGPIE prototype’s831
transcription and analysis phases to complete, according to832
the prescribed collection window interval.833
For each measure of detection performance, we employ834
timestamp window labelling to indicate whether a predicted835
data sample’s label belongs to an attack window or a non-836
attack window. In terms of accuracy, the Jaccard similarity837
coefficient is used as a measure of prediction performance to838
compare a set of predicted data sample labels to a correspond-839
ing set of ground truth labels.840
A. (Contribution 1) Ability to recognise new smart home841
threats by continuous adaptation to changing conditions842
At its inception, a newly installed smart home can be843
safely assumed to be free from attacks. Therefore, a low844
anomaly detection sensitivity (e.g., χ - contamination value845
for isolation forest anomaly decision function) is a sensible846
choice for system initialisation. However, over time, the level847
of data contamination supporting this condition will drift due848
to changes in the smart home configuration or actual attacks849
(which may be undetectable at the time of occurrence due to850
the current detection sensitivity). The same applies to selecting851
the anomaly detection sensitivity for an existing smart home.852
In Figures 11 and 10, the experimental results of the RL853
training show that EXP3 achieved the lowest average cumu-854
lative regret and highest average cumulative reward compared855
to a non-stationary UCB strategy, whereas both EXP3 and856
UCB comfortably outperformed a naive random arm selec-857
tion strategy. In terms of cumulative reward, initially, minor858
increases in observed reward occur due to the relatively small859
distribution range between rewards (see Figure 10). The effect860
on performance for both EXP3 and UCB therefore indicates861
that a sufficiently large step horizon is required to reach an862
optimal and reliable arm selection state, as per the objectives of863
the MAGPIE MAB RL process. Following our experimental864
comparison of MAB algorithms, EXP3 was selected as the865
P* θ χ Mode* ACC TPR TNR PPV NIR
3 0.3 Random† 0.67 0.78 0.55 0.66 0.60RL 0.85 0.99 0.82 0.64 0.60
7 0.1 Random† 0.68 0.79 0.56 0.68 0.61RL 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.83 0.61
Table XI: Average detection accuracy for RL χ adaptation Vs.
randomly selected χ, P* Occupant presence in smart home
testbed, † Average over 100 runs, selecting from 10 bandit
Arms (i.e., χ bins - see Table VIII)
optimal bandit algorithm for solving the anomaly classifier 866
detection adaptation objective in MAGPIE. Following a fixed- 867
step horizon selection policy, in Figure 12, EXP3 reported 868
optimal arm weights χ=0.01 (ARM 4) and χ=0.005 (ARM 869
3) for the presence and non-presence anomaly classifier con- 870
figurations, respectively. To analyse the quality of the EXP3 871
selected χ configuration parameters, we derived AUC-ROC 872
curves for models trained with each specific χ parameter in 873
Figure 13. The results show that for overall model detection 874
accuracy, when applying the θ threshold across all attacks 875
we evaluated, EXP3 selected the optimal χ parameter for the 876
presence and no-presence anomaly models. In terms of overall 877
AUC, the selected arms were ranked first (AUC=0.90) and 878
third (AUC=0.88) for the presence and no-presence models, 879
respectively. 880
In summary, the results presented in Table XI demonstrate 881
that the combination of EXP3 with our probabilistic reward 882
algorithm is a reliable mechanism for optimising detection 883
performance. Figure 9 shows RL optimised the unsupervised 884
detection accuracy for each θ when tested against the attack 885
vector in our testbed. 886
Analysis of the presence datasets (orange radar) shows 887
poor detection accuracy for attack A5 (malware-enabled audio 888
injection; ACC: 60% Vs. 55% no information rate - NIR). This 889
decrease in accuracy when occupants are present is likely due 890
to the attack pattern of A5 blending in with the occupants’ 891
own use of the home assistant. Therefore, to improve detection 892
of A5 in future work, more expressive features are required 893
(such as voice command recognition or individual modelling 894
of sound and IP/WiFi traffic mean absolute deviation according 895
to the time of day) to provide greater behavioural context 896
to the anomaly detection process. Omitting A5 from the 897
aggregated results yields an overall detection accuracy for 898
occupant presence models of 89%, an F1 score of 81%, TPR 899
of 99%, TNR of 84% and precision of 72%. On the other hand, 900
A5 is easily detectable by no-presence models (for the static 901
presence model configuration) due to the abnormal occurrence 902
of sustained levels of sound, with a detection accuracy of 93%. 903
The no-presence model achieved an F1 score of 85%, TPR of 904
90%, TNR of 87% and precision of 83%. For individual attack 905
adaptation, RL also reports fairly low accuracy for attack A7 906
in the presence models and attack A6 in both the presence and 907
no-presence models. 908
In practice, the optimal θ for presence and no-presence 909
threat detection may not be selected as the preferred value. 910
Importantly, the results show that a range of different θ settings 911
influence the RL adaptation process, whereby high θ values 912
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Figure 9: Risk-based RL-optimised anomaly detection accuracy [%] (Presence = Orange, No Presence = Blue, MAB Arm 3:
χ = 0.005, MAB Arm 4: χ = 0.01)
Figure 10: Average cumulative χ selection regret for random
(blue), non-stationary UCB (orange dash), and EXP3 (green
points) MAB algorithms over a 6000 step horizon across 3
runs
(a) Average cumulative regret (b) Average cumulative reward
Figure 11: Cumulative χ selection reward and regret for ran-
dom (blue), non-stationary UCB (orange) and EXP3 (green)
MAB algorithms over a 6000 step horizon across 3 runs
(a) No-presence arm weights (b) Presence arm weights
Figure 12: EXP3 weights for bandit arms (χ) over a 6000 step
horizon
(a) No-presence AUC ROC (b) Presence AUC ROC
Figure 13: AUC ROC curves for MAGPIE bandit arms (χ
hyperparameters
(0.7 and 0.9) are the least effective for both presence and 913
no-presence models. In general, high θ favours high anomaly 914
scores, which reduces false positives but may increase false 915
negatives. This characteristic can be observed for attack A7 916
(workflow automation compromise), where MAGPIE reduces 917
each set of attack data points to a single sample per window 918
(based on source and destination identity), which in turn is 919
saturated by a high volume of normal traffic, thus lowering 920
the anomaly score. Overall, the detection results illustrated 921
in Figure 9 demonstrate that the non-stationary UCB im- 922
plementation is effective at adapting the detection sensitivity 923
to optimise the threat detection performance according to 924
the occupants’ θ configuration. From here on, we assess the 925
MAGPIE prototype’s threat detection performance according 926
to the best-performing θ and RL optimised isolation forest χ 927
parameters. 928
B. (Contribution 2) Considering both cyber and physical 929
sources of data 930
Applying the best θ and χ parameters, for both individual 931
and aggregate attack dataset RL adaptation, in Figure 14 the 932
detection accuracy for the presence and no-presence models 933
across different MDS cyber and cyber-physical feature models 934
is presented. Here, MAGPIE prototype threat detection is 935
demonstrably more accurate, on average, when both cyber and 936
physical smart home data sources are used compared to cyber 937
features only. However, even without physical features (in this 938
case RF, audio and WiFi RSSI), extending the collection of 939
cyber features beyond traditional monitoring of TCP/IP traffic 940
significantly improves the detection accuracy across a wide 941
range of attack vectors in the smart home. 942
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Figure 14: Attack detection performance results comparison
for MDS models with cyber+physical features, multiple cyber
features and cyber features based on the TCP/IP stack only
Figure 15: Presence inference accuracy for each attack (Avg.
ACC: θ 0.3=0.93, θ 0.5=0.81, θ 0.7=0.76)
C. (Contribution 3) Self-configuration based on automated943
inference of human presence944
Figure 15 shows that presence inference returned high clas-945
sification accuracy during both attack and non-attack scenar-946
ios. A choice of θ = 0.3 yielded the highest overall accuracy947
(93%) across both the presence and no-presence datasets.948
However, there is a noticeable accuracy drop compared to949
static detection model assignment for correctly detecting pres-950
ence during the audio injection attack (A5) when there is no951
presence (62%). This is because the random forest detection952
model has determined higher audio values to be associated953
with presence state and thus incorrectly identifies the audio in-954
jection attack as occupant presence. Consequently, this failure955
has a negative impact on the detection of audio injection with956
a high sensitivity for presence inference. On the other hand,957
whilst increasing θ to 0.5 increases the detection accuracy for958
audio injection during no presence (83%; increasing further959
to 97% for θ = 0.54 - not shown in Figure 15), this change960
has a negative effect on detection accuracy for attacks A6 and961
A7 and further reduces the A5 detection accuracy during the962
occupant presence state.963
Figure 17 shows a noticeable advantage of dynamic recon-964
figuration based on presence inference. When utilising the best965
high and very high θ values for presence and no-presence966
anomaly models, respectively, the method achieves slightly967
lower detection accuracy overall (significantly lower in the968
case of audio injection - A5 for non-presence) compared to969
static model assignment (which requires explicit occupant re-970
configuration to function, e.g., the occupant informing the971
system when they are no longer present or active). Crucially,972
however, without static or dynamic anomaly model assign-973
ment, for both the presence and no-presence models, individual974
detection performance for alternate datasets is considerably975
worse overall.976
Figure 16: AUC ROC curve (TPR Vs. FPR) performance for
presence inference during smart home attacks
Figure 17: Performance for static presence, no presence and
dynamic real-time presence anomaly model selection
The experimental results are promising, especially as the 977
fusion of cyber and physical MDS features has proven to 978
be valuable for improving presence inference, as further ev- 979
idenced in the area under curve (AUC) receiver operating 980
characteristic analysis on new, unseen MDS data shown in 981
Figure 16. Compared to the AUC score of 0.66 when only 982
cyber data sources are used, the aggregation of cyber and 983
physical data sources (i.e., the aMDS feed) yields an AUC of 984
0.98 for presence inference. Here, instead of training a single 985
MDS model for both presence and anomaly detection, affected 986
by increases in model dimensionality and feature-masking for 987
window synchronisation, these results demonstrate that a ded- 988
icated presence classifier supports the selection of presence- 989
specific MDS models that directly benefit from the feature 990
context to detect attacks more accurately. 991
D. Threat detection latency 992
Analysis of the detection latency using the best θ and 993
χ RL parameters for the presence and no-presence datasets 994
produced variable results for each attack. These differences 995
were expected, as the impact of different attacks on cyber 996
and physical feature behaviour may only become noticeable 997
later in the course of execution. For attacks A1, A2 and A7, 998
during human presence, detection was immediately triggered 999
(detection latency = 1 monitoring window) when the attack 1000
was executed in the collection window, but the initial discovery 1001
of A3 and A4 was three times slower and that of A6 was five 1002
times slower. In the presence condition, A5 was undetectable. 1003
In the no human presence condition, attacks A2, A4 and 1004
A5 reported immediate detection, A1 and A3 required an 1005
additional collection window for identification, and A6 and 1006
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A7 were four and three times slower, respectively. MAGPIE1007
has demonstrated that it is able to detect an attack soon after it1008
is executed, but there remains a trade-off in detection latency1009
and detection accuracy to be explored in the future.1010
VI. FUTURE WORK1011
In future work, the q parameter is an interesting and poten-1012
tial candidate for further exploration within the RL action-1013
space for dynamic q assignments, alongside unsupervised1014
model hyperparameter adaptation. However, a consideration1015
when introducing q in this manner is that it increases the1016
computational complexity for the RL action-space. As ob-1017
served in Figure 3, the benefit of the increased complexity does1018
not clearly outweigh the simpler static q definition. Therefore,1019
dynamic determination of the optimal q is an area that would1020
ideally be explored in the context of collaborative learning,1021
such as federated threat detection adaptation in experiments1022
across multiple coordinating households and MAGPIE agents,1023
with varying MDS configurations and contrasting attack vec-1024
tors.1025
It would also be interesting to explore how MAGPIE’s1026
detection adaptation might be applied in the form of cyber1027
resilience capability for machine-learning-based intrusion de-1028
tection itself, for example, as a proactive defence mechanism1029
against emerging adversarial machine learning attacks [45] that1030
disrupt detection accuracy in cyber-physical systems.1031
VII. CONCLUSION1032
We have evaluated MAGPIE in terms of four primary1033
contributions: the ability to detect previously unseen attacks1034
while taking into account the user’s risk tolerance; the ability1035
to adapt to changing conditions via reinforcement learning; the1036
benefit of using both cyber and physical sources of data; and1037
self-configuration of the choice of models based on whether1038
user presence is detected or not. The prototype has performed1039
well across a range of attack vectors at the application,1040
network, data link and physical layers. We have observed that1041
the incorporation of physical sources of data can noticeably1042
improve the performance for most of the attacks, especially for1043
attacks that are normally undetectable by systems that monitor1044
only TCP/IP traffic. We have also observed that by leveraging1045
the same data sources as for anomaly detection, we can detect1046
user presence sufficiently reliably, which in turn helps tailor1047
the anomaly detection models to the two cases of presence1048
and no presence, thereby improving their accuracy. Most1049
importantly, we have successfully tested our intuition that1050
in the context of smart home attacks, reinforcement learning1051
can meaningfully adapt an unsupervised anomaly classifier’s1052
hyperparameters based on its own confidence in its output.1053
We have made the source code of the MAGPIE imple-1054
mentation available to the research community to facilitate1055
extensions and experimental evaluation comparisons with new1056
methods. A natural extension would be to add real-time1057
response capabilities, such as isolating offending nodes or re-1058
configuring the radio frequency channel. Additionally, MAG-1059
PIE can be extended to incorporate feedback from the user, for1060
example, to confirm whether a suspected anomalous device or1061
network behaviour is a result of their own activity or not, to1062
further improve the accuracy.1063
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